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Logical gaps in the approximate solutions of the social learning game and an exact solution
Wenjie Dai, Xin Wang, Zengru Di, Jinshan Wu†
School of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
After the social learning models were proposed, finding the solutions of the games becomes a well-defined
mathematical question. However, almost all papers on the games and their applications are based on solutions
built upon either an add-hoc argument or a twisted Bayesian analysis of the games. Here, we present logical
gaps in those solutions and an exact solution of our own. We also introduced a minor extension to the original
game such that not only logical difference but also difference in action outcomes among those solutions become
visible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The original version of social learning game (see [1, 2] for
an introduction and a short review) is a problem with N learn-
ers in which each learner (denoted as learner j) attempts to
identify and act accordingly the true status of a world, which
is either in a state 1 with probability qext = 0.5 or in an-
other state −1 with probability 1 − qext, from observing her
own private signals (sj) and all previous learners’ actions
(~aj−1 = (a1a2 · · · aj−1)) but without explicitly knowing the
previous learners’ private signals (~sj−1 = (s1s2 · · · sj−1)).
In the game it is assumed that the private signal received by
each learner has a probability p ≥ 0.5 to be the true status of
the world. It is usually required that one learner takes an ac-
tion in every round. Usually, the turn order of learners’ action
is externally given. A learner receives a positive payoff (M+)
when her action is the same as the status of the world, and a
negative payoff (−M−, here M+ = M− is assumed, although
generally speaking they can be different) otherwise.
It has been shown[3, 4] that in this typical setup there is in-
formation cascade which can lead to either the proper status
of the world or the wrong status even when all the learners are
fully rational. After the cascade happens, the rest of all learn-
ers choose the same action. Since it is always good to have
a better mechanism to encourage cascading towards the true
status and reduce the probability of the other, it is necessary to
find the equilibriums of this game and to calculate accurately
under what conditions such cascading happen.
One key problem in doing so for the social learning game
is how, for a learner at the jth place to find out the probabil-
ity distribution of world’s status, given the historical record of
previous learner’s action
(
a1a2 · · ·aj−1
)
and her private sig-
nal sj ,
λj = P
(
sw = 1|a
1a2 · · · aj−1, sj
)
, (1)
where sw can be ±1 and it refers to status of the world,
ai = ±1 is the observed ith learner’s action and sj is the jth
learner’s private signal. Once a learner knows precisely this
probability, she can always make an informed decision. Un-
der the assumption that all other learners are as rational and
capable as the jth learner herself, finding the right formula to
calculate λj such that she will get the maximum payoff is a
well-defined mathematical problem.
An exact solution of this mathematical problem refers to
a fully rational solution of the above problem from an ideal
learner with potentially infinite capability of mathematical
calculation. However, except in the case where the private
signal is also open to the public, there is not yet an exact pro-
cedure to calculate this λj .
A common method of avoiding the calculation of this λj
is for the jth learner to count the number of actions with an
observed value of 1 (denoted as N j−1,a+ ) and the number of
actions with an observed value of −1 (N j−1,a− ) in the previ-
ous (j − 1) actions and then to choose to act in concert with
the majority after including her own private signals. We call
this technique the blind action-counting approach and denote
the calculated probability as λj,B in the following. Quite often
in theoretical analysis of the social learning game, one focus
on the phenomenon of “cascading”: After observing certain
2number of previous actions, the rest learners choose the same
action no matter what their private signals are. Using the blind
action-counting λj,B , it is easy to find out that for the original
game two consecutive actions, when they are the same, deter-
mines action of the next player and thus all the rest players.
Therefore, one can study the game by simply enumerating all
the cases where cascade happens. However, there is no solid
mathematical foundation here to claim that this blind action-
counting approach is the best or the exact solution. This ap-
proach is commonly used in analysis of the social learning
games[2, 3, 5–8].
Another commonly used method is based on a Bayesian
analysis of the game[9–14]. We will comment on these two
solutions and demonstrate where are the logical gaps in the
two solutions in the next section.
The main contribution of this manuscript, besides showing
the gaps in the two approximate solutions, is presenting an ex-
act solution of our own. We will first present such a calcula-
tion and then compare it against the two approximate solutions
on the original game. Although as we will see later our own
solution is in principle different from the other two, we will
see that there is almost no difference at all among the three
solutions on the original social learning game. While we will
comment on the reason of this, we propose a minor extension
of the social learning game, to which all the solutions should
be applicable as well if they are all proper to the original ver-
sion. We will, however, demonstrate that the three solutions
lead to different average payoffs and on average our exact so-
lution has the highest payoff in the extended games. We wish
this should be sufficient to illustrate that the two approximate
solutions are not as good as the exact ones.
II. LOGICAL GAPS IN THE BLIND ACTION-COUNTING
AND THE TWISTED BAYESIAN APPROACHES OF THE
SOCIAL LEARNING GAME
In the original definition of the social learning game, all
learners know that the true status of the world follows a known
priori distribution of all possibilities, which is usually taken as
(1,−1): with a probability qext = 0.5 the status of the world
is 1, i.e. ,
qext = P (sw = 1) . (2)
However, after the world’s status is initiated it stays at that
status during the entire learning process. After the above-
mentioned λj = P
(
sw = 1|a
1a2 · · · aj−1, sj
)
is known, the
rest of decision making process is trivial, i.e. aj = 1 when
M+λ
j −M−
(
1− λj
)
> 0 =⇒ λj >
1
2
. (3)
and aj = −1 when λj < 12 . For the case of λ
j = 12 additional
tie-breaking rules are required, for example
aj =


1 λj > 12
random(1,−1) otherwise
−1 λj < 12
(4)
Here random(1,−1) means to take one value from 1 and
−1 with equal probability. Other tie-breaking rules are also
possible[4, 9]. This relation between aj and λj can also be
denoted as
aj = sign
(
λj −
1
2
)
, (5)
which in the special case of sign (0) is assumed to be
random(1,−1) instead of its usual value sign (0) = 0. In or-
der to use this relation between aj and λj conveniently in later
derivations, Eq. (4) can also be represented by a distribution
function of aj ∈ {1,−1} as
P
(
aj |λj
)
= δ
(
aj, sign
(
λj −
1
2
))
, (6)
where δ (i, j) is the Kronecker δ notation that it is 1 when
i = j and 0 otherwise. One can check that Eq. (4), Eq. (5)
and Eq. (6) are in fact the same even though the latter takes a
form of probability distribution,
P
(
aj |λj
)
=


{
1 aj = 1
0 aj = −1
, λj > 12{
1
2 a
j = 1
1
2 a
j = −1
, λj = 12{
0 aj = 1
1 aj = −1
, λj < 12
. (7)
The probability distribution form of Eq. (6) is very impor-
tant in deriving our exact procedure. As we will see later, the
whole derivation is based on the Bayesian formula, so it is
necessary to write all formulae in probability forms.
Now that all of our terminologies and notations have been
defined, let us start our discussions on solutions of the so-
cial learning game. We have mentioned that the only non-
trivial part of the decision making process of the social learn-
ing game is the calculation of λj . As we stated in the intro-
duction, there are usually two approaches for this calculation.
One is to simply count how many times action 1(−1) has been
taken previously and denoted it as N j−1,a+ (N j−1,a− ) and com-
pare the two values while taking into account her own private
signal sj , i.e.
aj = sign
(
N
j−1,a
+ + s
j −N j−1,a−
)
. (8)
From this formula, it seems that this decision making process
does not really need λj . We will show later in § III B that in
fact, it assumes a very special form of λj , and under which,
Eq. (8) can be derived. There we will see clearly what is miss-
ing in the argument. Here, we first want to present a count ar-
gument to point out that there might be better decision making
mechanisms other than this blind action-counting approach.
Consider the case of a private signal sequence
(
s1, s2
)
=
(1,−1) and the corresponding action sequence being(
a1, a2
)
= (1, 1), which is possible under the random tie-
breaking rule. Up on observing this action sequence, accord-
ing to the blind action-counting approach, the third learner
3will definitely choose the action a3 = 1 no matter what her
private signal is. Assuming that her private signal is s3 = −1,
then there is in fact a higher chance that the world is in state
sw = −1 other than sw = 1. However, as argued above,
the third learner will choose a3 = 1 and thus also the future
learners. Therefore, this leads to a wrong cascade.
Of course, generally speaking when
(
a1, a2
)
= (1, 1) is
observed, it more likely that the world is indeed in a state of
sw = 1, so it is not that wrong to choose action a3 = 1.
However, at least, in principle, when the third learner gets
s3 = −1, she should be more careful than simply discard-
ing her own signal especially when she is fully aware of the
random tie-breaking rule. Is there any possibility to take this
into consideration? The answer is no according to the blind
action-counting approximate solution. Will any other solu-
tions be able to take care of this and do better?
For example, if she is good at mathe-
matics, she should be able to calculate that
P
((
s1, s2
)
= (1, 1) |
(
a1, a2
)
= (1, 1)
)
= 23 and
P
((
s1, s2
)
= (1,−1) |
(
a1, a2
)
= (1, 1)
)
= 13 using
the Bayesian Formula. Considering her own signal s3 = −1,
she will be less confident that she should choose action
a3 = 1 although she might still do. Maybe in some other
cases, from the extra bit of inferred information, she will
find that the different between the conflicting probability is
even smaller than 23 −
1
3 , such that maybe she will choose an
action that is different from what she will choose from simply
counting N j−1,a± . As we will see later, this is the whole spirit
of this work: Figuring out something like ~sj−1 from ~aj−1
first and then making better decisions, instead of directly
counting N j,a± from ~aj−1.
The second commonly used approach[9–14] of calcula-
tion of this λj is more involved than counting N j,a± . Let
us rephrase the formula originally from [9] here in terms of
our own notations. Assuming ξj−1 = P
(
sw = 1 | ~a
j−1
)
is
known to the jth learner for some reasons, which will be ex-
plained later, using Bayesian formula, we can have
λj = P
(
sw = 1|~a
j−1, sj
)
=
P
(
sw = 1, s
j |~aj−1
)
P (sj |~aj−1)
=
P
(
sj |sw = 1,~a
j−1
)
P
(
sw = 1|~a
j−1
)
P (sj |~aj−1)
=
P
(
sw = 1|~a
j−1
)
P
(
sj |sw = 1
)
P (sj |sw = 1)P (sw = 1|~aj−1) + P (sj |sw = −1)P (sw = −1|~aj−1)
. (9)
This leads to
λj =
{
ξj−1p
ξj−1p+(1−ξj−1)(1−p) s
j = 1
ξj−1(1−p)
ξj−1(1−p)+(1−ξj−1)p s
j = −1
. (10)
This formula linking ξj−1 to λj , while it has a very confusing
meaning as we will show latter, is mathematically sound. In
order to form a closed formula system, it requires a formula
linking λj to ξj , such that the next iteration will give λj+1,
ξj
(
sw = 1|~a
j−1, aj
)
= λjeff
(
sw = 1|~a
j−1, s
j
eff
)
=
{
ξj−1p
ξj−1p+(1−ξj−1)(1−p) a
j = 1
ξj−1(1−p)
ξj−1(1−p)+(1−ξj−1)p a
j = −1
. (11)
In a sense, this assumes that upon observing aj = 1, the
(j + 1)th learner will effectively think that sj = 1 and sim-
ilarly when observing aj = −1. However, this step, exactly
this step, is not necessary true.
To summarize, the above Bayesian analysis can be ex-
pressed as
ξj−1
Eq. (10)
−−−−→
sj
λj
Eq. (4)
−−−→ aj
Eq. (11)
−−−−→ ξj . (12)
The argument behind Eq. (11) is that when the action aj = 1
is taken, effectively sj = 1, no matter what the private signal
4really is and the same for the case of aj = −1. However,
while overall, this assumption is not that far off, this is exactly
where the logical mistake is. We call the above λj calculated
by the above twisted Bayesian approach especially from Eq.
(11) the twisted-Bayesian approach and denoted it as λj,tB . If
we are going to follow this line of thinking we need a better
formula from λj to ξj .
There is another potentially misleading part in the above
derivation of Eq. (9): While it is not mathematically wrong,
letting P
(
sj |sw = 1,~a
j−1
)
= P
(
sj |sw = 1
)
is logically not
straight. In the left-hand side, we are thinking that knowing
only the action history ~aj−1 thus we need to figure out distri-
bution of sw first according to this ~aj−1, and then using this
‘figured out’ distribution of sw and limit ourselves in consid-
ering only the subset of sw = 1, and then to calculate proba-
bility distribution of sj within the subset of sw = 1; in right-
hand side, we are thinking that when sw is known then the
distribution of sj depends only on sw but not on ~aj−1. This
two expressions are not at the same level of logic. One way of
out of this insecure practice of mathematics is to avoid totally
P
(
sj |~aj−1
)
but consider instead things like P
(
sj |sw = 1
)
and P
(
~aj−1|sw = 1
)
, which are absolutely well-defined. We
do so in the next section when constructing exact formula of
λj .
In one word, the blind action-counting approach does not
make use of the full information so that there are rooms for
better solutions and the twisted Bayesian analysis missing one
important step in its mathematical formalism: There is no
solid mathematical ground for Eq. (11) which links λj to ξj .
In the rest of this manuscript, we will present a solution
that makes use of the full information and also every step of
it has a solid mathematical ground. The only catch is that
it is quite mathematically involved and the idea is originated
from statistical physics, which might not be a common or fa-
miliar toolbox to researchers in social learning, game theory
or even other fields of economics. In statistical physics, non-
interacting systems are much easier to deal with and quite of-
ten it provide a good starting point to build up formalism to
tackle interacting systems. It is exactly this beauty of statisti-
cal physics that makes it possible to develop our own calcula-
tion of λj .
III. EXACT FORMULA OF λj
The primary step in a theoretical study of the social learn-
ing game is to explicitly solve λj as defined mathemati-
cally in Eq. (1) assuming that all learners are fully ra-
tional and with infinite capability of mathematical calcula-
tion. Using the Bayesian formula, we can rearrange λj =
P
(
sw = 1|~a
j−1, sj
)
as
λj =
P
(
~aj−1, sj|sw = 1
)
P (sw = 1)
P (~aj−1, sj |sw = 1)P (sw = 1) + P (~aj−1, sj|sw = −1)P (sw = −1)
=
P
(
~aj−1|sw = 1
)
P
(
sj |sw = 1
)
qext
P (~aj−1|sw = 1)P (sj |sw = 1) qext + P (~aj−1|sw = −1)P (sj |sw = −1) (1− qext)
. (13)
Here, in the last step, we have used the fact that the previ-
ous actions and the current private signal are two independent
events. There is only one unknown term in Eq. (13)
p~a
j−1
sw
= P
(
~aj−1|sw
)
, (14)
and we denote it as p~aj−1sw , which is the probability of history
of a specific previous j − 1 actions being ~aj−1, given world
status sw. This quantity p~a
j−1
sw
is different from the ξj−1 =
P
(
sw|~a
j−1
)
defined in the twisted Bayesian approach.
Notice the above λj is subjective, i.e. , it is in the jth
learner’s mind that how much she believes the status of the
world is sw = 1 with given information ~aj−1 and sj . There-
fore, p~aj−1sw is also subjective. In the future in calculating the
rate of accuracy and the probability of cascading, we will need
an objective probability P~asw . The way to find this P~asw is to
use
P~asw=1 =
∑
~s
p~a~sp
~s
sw=1, (15)
where p~ssw=1 is totally objective and has nothing to do with
learners’ decision making and p~a~s is the probabilities of all ac-
tion outcomes ~a given signal sequence ~s and it depends on
learners’ decision making. The way to calculate P~asw=1 is to
find out all action outcomes ~a of a given ~s and then sum over
all ~s leading to the same ~a according to Eq. (15). In order to
calculate p~a~s , we need to generate all possible signal sequences
~s and go through the decision-making process, according to
given approach of calculating λj , to find out action sequences
~a for each of the sequences ~s. Notice that p~asw=1 and P
~a
sw=1
are potentially different.
A. A simpler case where private signals are open to the public
— finding p~s
j−1
sw
Calculating p~aj−1sw directly is not easy, however, it is
straightforward to calculate p~sj−1sw ,
p~s
j−1
sw
= Πj−1l=1P
(
sl|sw
)
, (16)
5where
P
(
sl|sw
)
= p
1+sl
2 (1− p)
1−sl
2 δsw ,1 + (1− p)
1+sl
2 p
1−sl
2 δsw,−1. (17)
Using the signal counting N j−1,s+ and N
j−1,s
− , we arrive at
p~s
j−1
sw=1 = p
N
j−1,s
+ (1− p)
N
j−1,s
− , (18)
p~s
j−1
sw=−1 = p
N
j−1,s
− (1− p)
N
j−1,s
+ . (19)
In terms of these notations, if the private signals are available
to the public, then upon receiving a signal sj = 1 and provid-
ing N j−1± , according to the Bayesian formula,
λj,S = P
(
sw = 1|~s
j
)
=
P
(
~sj|sw = 1
)
qext
P (~sj |sw = 1) qext + P (~sj |sw = −1) (1− qext)
, (20)
the probability that the world’s status is sw = 1 can be ex-
pressed as
λj,S
(
~sj−1, sj
)
=
1
1 +
(
1−p
p
)∆Nj−1,s+sj
1−qext
qext
, (21)
where ∆N j−1,s =
∑j−1
l=1 s
l
. When qext = 0.5, this proba-
bility is more than 12 as long as
(
1−p
p
)∆Nj−1,s+1
< 1. It de-
pends only on∆N j−1,s. λj > 0.5 as long as∆N j−1,s+sj >
0. Similar procedure for this public-signal case has also been
discussed in [15].
Next, we generalize the above calculation to the case where
only the actions but not the private signals are known to learn-
ers.
B. Blind action-counting λj,B
Before that we want to spend a little bit of our time on re-
visiting of the blind action-counting approach. From the re-
visiting we will clearly see what information is missing in the
blind action-counting approach.
Even when only previous actions but not private sig-
nals are available to the public, let us assume for now that
N
j−1,a
± includes as much information as N
j−1,s
± , thus from
Eq. (21) we have,
λj,B
(
~aj−1, sj
)
=
1
1 +
(
1−p
p
)∆Nj−1,a+sj
1−qext
qext
, (22)
where∆N j−1,a =
∑j−1
l=1 a
l
. Learners adopting this decision-
making mechanism are regarding action sequences provide
as much information as signal sequences. This is obviously
wrong. It can be shown that according to this formula, λj,B >
1
2 if ∆N
j−1,a + sj > 0 and therefore it lead exactly to Eq.
(8).
In many previous studies of the social learning, calculations
of probability of cascades and other quantities were based on
this λj,B [2, 3, 5–8]. This is potentially sub optimal since
action sequences are treated as reliable as signal sequences.
Next, we are going to present one solution, in which signal
sequences and their distributions are figured out first from ac-
tion sequences and then decision is made upon the inferred
signal sequences.
C. From p~sj−1sw to p~a
j−1
sw for exact λ
j,A
The idea is very simple. If we can turn the history of actions
into history of signals, then we can make use of the above
p~s
j−1
sw
and then everything is done. That is to say, we want all
possible signals ~sj−1 which lead to action ~aj−1. Making use
of the law of total probability, we have
p~a
j−1
sw
=
∑
~sj−1
P
(
~aj−1|~sj−1, sw
)
p~s
j−1
sw
, (23)
where P
(
~aj−1|~sj−1, sw
)
is related to the decision making
process, and which does not directly involves sw because sw
is not explicitly known to learners. Therefore,
P
(
~aj−1|~sj−1, sw
)
= P
(
~aj−1|~sj−1
)
≡ p~a
j−1
~sj−1 . (24)
We first notice that because we assume that learners make no
mistakes, ~aj−1 is fully determined by ~sj−1 and the signal vec-
tor ~sj−2 of previous learners has no direct effect on the current
6(j − 1)th learner’s decision. Thus,
p~a
j−1
~sj−1 = P
(
~aj−2|~sj−1
)
P
(
aj−1|~sj−1
)
= P
(
~aj−2|~sj−2
)
P
(
aj−1|~sj−2, sj−1
)
= p~a
j−2
~sj−2P
(
aj−1|~aj−2, sj−1
)
= p~a
j−2
~sj−2 δ
(
aj−1, sign
(
λj−1
(
~aj−2, sj−1
)
−
1
2
))
. (25)
In the second last step, we have used the fact that aj−1
is not directly determined by
(
~sj−2, sj−1
)
, but is indirectly
determined by
(
~aj−2, sj−1
)
, which in turn results from(
~sj−2, sj−1
)
.
Combining Eq. (25) and Eq. (23), we obtain
p~a
j−1
sw
=
∑
~sj−2,sj−1
p~a
j−2
~sj−2 δ
(
aj−1, sign
(
λj−1
(
~aj−2, sj−1
)
−
1
2
))
p~s
j−2
sw
ps
j−1
sw
,
= p~a
j−2
sw
∑
sj−1
δ
(
aj−1, sign
(
λj−1
(
~aj−2, sj−1
)
−
1
2
))
ps
j−1
sw
. (26)
Here we have used the fact that p~sj−1sw = p
~sj−2
sw
ps
j−1
sw
. Eq. (26)
is the central formula of the present work.
Eq. (13) and Eq. (26) present an iterative procedure to find
all λj ,
~aj−1
Eq. (26)
−−−−→∑
sj−1
p~a
j−1
sw
Eq.(13)
−−−−−→
sj
λj
(
~aj−1, sj
) Eq.(4)
−−−−→ ~aj , (27)
where ~aj−1, p~aj−1sw and the action outcome a
j are public infor-
mation, while the λj is private to the jth learner since sj is hid-
den from the public. We call the λj calculated from the proce-
dure defined in Eq. (27) the exact solution λj,A since it solve
exactly the mathematical problem of finding P
(
sw|~a
j−1, sj
)
.
Here the Superscript A refers to the fact that it is calculated
from histories of actions.
D. Examples showing that λj,A is potentially different from
λj,B and λj,tB
Next we illustrate this iterative calculation λj,A step by step
on the original social learning game. For λ1, there is no pre-
vious p~a0sw (this quantity may be equivalently set to 1), so we
can directly make use of Eq. (13),
λ1,A
(
sw = 1|s
1 = 1
)
=
1
1 +
(
1−p
p
)
1−qext
qext
, (28a)
λ1,A
(
sw = 1|s
1 = −1
)
=
1
1 +
(
1−p
p
)−1
1−qext
qext
. (28b)
It is easy to confirm that at this first step λ1,B has exactly the
same form as λ1,A. For the λj,tB procedure, we start from
assuming ξ0 = p
(
sw = 1|a
0
)
= qext, it is easy to confirm
from Eq. (10) that λ1,tB = λ1,A too.
Following the iterative procedure of λj,A, as the second
learner we now need to calculate p~a2−1sw = p
a1
sw
as follows,
pa
1
sw
=
∑
s1
δ
(
a1, sign
(
λ1
(
~a0, s1
)
−
1
2
))
ps
1
sw
. (29)
We see that there is a summation over s1, because s1 is un-
known to the second learner. In principle, all values of s1
might lead to a given action a1 and the corresponding proba-
bility is given by δ
(
a1, sign
(
λ1
(
~a0, s1
)
− 12
))
. Considering
the first step is just a Kronecker δ function δa1s1 , i.e. , a1 has
to be exactly s1, it is clear that,
pa
1
sw
= ps
1=a1
sw
. (30)
With p~a1sw , we are now ready to calculate λ
2,A using Eq. (13),
λ2,A
(
sw = 1|a
1 = 1, s2 = −1
)
=
1
1 + 1−q
ext
qext
. (31)
When qext = 0.5, this λ2,A
(
sw = 1|a
1 = 1, s2 = −1
)
=
0.5. Thus an informed decision would be to randomly choose
a2 = 1 or a2 = −1. Similarly we can find all other λ2,As.
It is easy to calculate λ2,B from sim-
ply counting ∆N1,a and we find λ2,B =
λ2,A. For λ2,tB
(
sw = 1|a
1 = 1, s2 = −1
)
,
we need ξ1
(
sw = 1|a
1 = 1
)
, which equals to
λ1,tB
(
sw = 1|s
2 = 1
)
= 1
1+( 1−pp )
1−qext
qext
. Thus from
Eq. (10), we get
7λ2,tB
(
sw = 1|a
1 = 1, s2 = −1
)
=
ξ1
(
sw = 1|a
1 = 1
)
(1− p)
ξ1 (sw = 1|a1 = 1) (1− p) + (1− ξ1 (sw = 1|a1 = 1)) p
=
1
1 + 1−q
ext
qext
, (32)
which again agrees with λ2,A
(
sw = 1|a
1 = 1, s2 = −1
)
.
There is no difference among λj,A, λj,B and λj,tB so far.
Proceeding now with the assumption that a2 = 1, we now
look at the third learner’s decision making process according
to either λ3,A, λ3,B or λ3,tB . Knowing a1 = 1, a2 = 1, and
given, say, s3 = −1, λ3,B is very straightforward,
λ3,B
(
sw = 1|a
12 = 11, s3 = −1
)
=
1
1 +
(
1−p
p
)
1−qext
qext
.
(33)
It is more tedious to calculate λ3,tB , since it requires ξ2, which
according to Eq. (10) in this case of a2 = 1 takes the value of
λ2,tB
(
sw = 1|a
1 = 1, s2 = 1
)
= 1
1+( 1−pp )
2 1−qext
qext
. Then Eq.
(10) gives us
λ3,tB
(
sw = 1|a
12 = 11, s3 = −1
)
=
1
1 +
(
1−p
p
)
1−qext
qext
= λ3,B
(
sw = 1|a
12 = 11, s3 = −1
)
. (34)
To calculate λ3,A, we need p~a2=11sw . Considering that a
1 = s1,
there are two ~s2 = {11, 1− 1}, both of which possibly lead
to ~a2 = 11. Taking into account both possibilities, we obtain
λ3,A
(
sw = 1|a
12 = 11, s3 = −1
)
=
1
1 + 2−p1+p
1−qext
qext
. (35)
Notice that this λ3,A is different from λ3,tB , which is the same
as λ3,B . In a sense, the latter considers only the possibility of
~s2 = {11}.
The difference between Eq. (35) and Eq. (33) may, in prin-
ciple, lead to different possible actions. When qext = 0.5,
p = 0.7, the above λ3,A = 0.57 and λ3,B = 0.7 = λ3,tB .
All the three λ3s in this case are larger than 0.5, although
their values are different, thus, this difference is not going
to generate different actions. However, it is generally speak-
ing possible to derive different actions from λ3,A = 0.57 and
λ3,B = 0.7 = λ3,tB . Next, we are going to consider such
possibilities.
Before further comparing between λj,A, λj,B and λj,tB , we
prove a theorem regarding the conditions of cascading, which
later will help us greatly reduce the complexity of calcula-
tions.
E. When cascades happen
Cascades have been a central topic in studies of social learn-
ing. With the idea behind λj,B , being to join the majority,
the cascading problem becomes to identify the probability of
two consecutive steps with the same actions occurring while
the actions before the consecutive two steps are evenly dis-
tributed. This is in fact the working criteria of cascading used
in many works including the well-known work of [3]. In this
way, one gets the analytical results of the probability of a cas-
cade before the end of the game N ,
P+cas =
p (p+ 1)
[
1−
(
p− p2
)N
2
]
2 (1− p+ p2)
, (36a)
P−cas =
(p− 2) (p− 1)
[
1−
(
p− p2
)N
2
]
2 (1− p+ p2)
. (36b)
Instead of λj,B , here we want to discuss the phenomenon
of cascading based on our exact λj,A. We will show that in
principle, the fact that two consecutive learners take the same
action is not a sufficient condition for cascading if decision is
made according to λj,A.
Theorem 1 The social learning game starting from the jth
learner goes into a cascading state 1 (−1) if and only if
p~a
j−1
sw=1
p~a
j−1
sw=−1
> p1−p
1−qext
qext
( p
~aj−1
sw=1
p~a
j−1
sw=−1
< 1−p
p
1−qext
qext
).
Proof. Cascading happens when aj = 1 ( aj = −1 ) no
matter what value the jth learner’s private signal sj is. First,
we find the cascading condition for the jth learner. In this
proof without loss of generality, we consider only the case of
aj = 1. From Eq. (13), we know aj = 1 is equivalent to
λj,A > 0.5. Considering the case sj = 1 and sj = −1, that
8condition becomes respectively
p~a
j−1
sw=1
p~a
j−1
sw=−1
>
p
1− p
1− qext
qext
(37)
p~a
j−1
sw=1
p~a
j−1
sw=−1
>
1− p
p
1− qext
qext
(38)
Eq. (38) is naturally satisfied if Eq. (37) is. So the condition
holds if and only if Eq. (37) is true. Second, we want to show
that whenever this occurs for the jth learner, the same holds
for the (j + 1) learner. From Eq. (26), given that aj = 1,
then
p~a
j−1,aj=1
sw
= p~a
j−1
sw
(
ps
j−1=1
sw
+ ps
j−1=−1
sw
)
= p~a
j−1
sw
(39)
Therefore, Eq. (37) is again satisfied for p~ajsw .
From this theorem, we know that cascading happens when-
ever the action taken by a learner does not depend on its pri-
vate signal. And whenever that happens, later learners can not
change this trend of cascading. This simplifies the iterative
calculation in that we may stop the iteration when such a cas-
cade is found once, since all the remaining learners will sim-
ply choose the same action. This is different from the prior
criteria of cascading [3] being that two consecutive learners
take the same action while the actions before the two were
evenly divided between the two actions. In fact, if λj,B is
plugged into Eq. (37), rather than the exact λj,A, we arrive at
the prior criteria. However, when λj,A is used, such criteria is
no longer sufficient because even after the criteria is met it is
possible for the next learner to jump out of the old “cascade”.
In fact, this is intuitively why the rate of accuracy based on
λj,A is higher than that of λj,B as we can see later with the
RD model from Figure 3.
We identify the place where cascading first happens for
each action history ~a and call it as l~a. If no cascading hap-
pens for a given process, then we let l~a = N , which is infinity
in the large N limit.
F. Comparison between the exact and the two approximate
solutions
With the exact decision making procedure λj,A equipped to
every learner, let us now discuss action outcomes of this social
learning game. Given values of p and qext, we define as the
rate of accuracy as
r =
∑
~a
P~asw=1

 1
N
N∑
j=1
(
ajsw
) , (40)
where the product ajsw = 1 when action aj is the same as
sw. This r describes average payoff of all learners in a game.
P~asw=1 is the objective probability of the action series ~a as
discussed in Eq. (15). Next we will compare this average
payoff of the three decision making procedures according to,
respectively λj,A, λj,B and λj,tB .
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FIG. 1. Rate of accuracy (a) and probability of cascading before N
(b) of the original RD models studied using the exact λj,A, compared
against the blind λj,B and the twisted Bayesian λj,tB . In (b), ana-
lytical results from [3] are also plotted. N = 30 in this and other
figurers, unless noted otherwise.
We are also interested in the whole probability of cascading
towards respectively aN = ±1 happening before the last step
N ,
P (±1)cas =
aN=±1∑
~a,l~a<N
P~asw=1. (41)
Here, all numerical results will be presented only for the
case of sw = 1 since the cases of sw = −1 and sw = 1
are exactly symmetric. For reasons that will be clear later, all
reported results in the following are from games with N = 30,
if not explicitly stated.
From Fig. 1, we can see that there is no large difference
on respectively the rates of accuracy (a) or the probabilities of
cascading(a) from all three solutions. In Fig. 1(b), analytical
results from [3] (also duplicated here as Eq. (36)) are plotted
and are shown to exactly agree with our numerical results.
As we can see from Eq. (33), Eq. (34) and and Eq. (35), the
three solutions lead to different quantitative values of λ. How-
ever, the qualitative conclusion that λ3 is larger/smaller than
1
2 is the same in all three solutions. Therefore, the three quan-
titatively different expressions give the same action. In this
sense, the simple action-counting approach and the twisted
Bayesian, while they are not proper in principle, are not bad
at all.
Next, we want to further illustrate that in more general situ-
ations different values of Eq. (35), Eq. (33) and Eq. (34) may
lead to different actions.
IV. MINOR MODIFICATIONS OF THE GAME AND
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EXACT AND THE
APPROXIMATE SOLUTIONS
We have seen that although both λj,B and λj,tB are only ap-
proximate solutions while λj,A provide the exact solution of
the mathematical problem of finding λj = P
(
sw|~a
j−1, sj
)
,
when applied to real games, there is not much difference
among the three solutions. Why? In order to see the differ-
ence, situations like a different action is taken after two con-
secutive same actions should play an essential role in the game
playing. In another word, there should be chances for the ex-
act λj,A to correct the wrong cascades. However, for the orig-
inal social learning game, such situation rarely happens. Here
9we propose some slight extensions of the game. The exten-
sion is so marginal that in principle, if all of them are proper
solutions of the original game, the three solutions should also
be proper solutions to the extended game. We will, however,
show that on the extended game there are visible differences
among results of the three solutions.
We introduce a parameter ∆ to represent reservation
of a learner to take an action, i.e. given λj =
P
(
sw = 1|a
1a2 · · ·aj−1, sj
)
, a learner j can make a decision
according to
aj = sign∆
(
λj −
1
2
)
=


1 λj > 12 +∆
random (1,−1) otherwise
−1 λj < 12 −∆
(42)
We take ∆ ∈
[
0, 12
]
. The same payoff structure applies here,
in so far as a learner wins M+ when her action is the same as
the world’s status and loses M− otherwise. Such a reservation
can be related with a service charge of taking actions in real
game playing. In that case, allowing the learners to take no
actions in their turn when 12 −∆ < λ
j < 12 +∆, i.e. replac-
ing random (1,−1) with simply 0, makes even a better sense.
However, here we will not discuss this additional modifica-
tion or the motivation of introducing this ∆. What we want to
argue is that there is nothing forbids the applicability of each
of the three above λjs to this extended model if they are ap-
plicable to the original one, where simply ∆ = 0 and it is the
only difference between the extended and the original games.
From where we stand, we simply want the difference between
Eq. (35), Eq. (33) and Eq. (34) to make a difference on action
outcomes.
Next, we want to compare results of the three solutions on
the extended model with ∆ 6= 0.
A. λj,A is different from λj,B and λj,tB when ∆ > 0
In §III D and §III F we have shown that although the re-
sulted formulae and the numerical values are different among
λj,A, λj,B and λj,tB , the resulted actions are not different at
all when ∆ = 0. Now let us do the same comparison when
∆ 6= 0. According to Eq. (35), Eq. (33) and Eq. (34),
when ∆ = 0.1 these two generate different actions: The third
learner choose to act randomly according to λj,A and choose
action 1 according to λj,B and λj,tB .
We also see manifestation of this difference in simulation
results. Where ∆ = 0.1, we see that rate of accuracy and the
probability of cascading calculated from λj,A, shown in Fig.
2, are different from and in fact higher than those calculated
from λj,B and λj,tB . Therefore, action sequences from the
strategic state λj,A must be different from those from λj,B or
λj,tB .
We have shown in Table I a list of possible action outcomes
according to all three procedures of λj for a specific signal
sequence, where we can clearly see that when qext = 0.5,
∆ = 0.1, p = 0.7 the action outcome from λj,A is dif-
ferent from those from λj,B and λj,tB . For this given ~s,
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
r
p
RD, A, ∆ = 0.1
RD, B, ∆ = 0.1
RD, tB, ∆ = 0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
P
±
p
RD, A, ∆ = 0.1, P+
RD, B, ∆ = 0.1, P+
RD, tB, ∆ = 0.1, P+
RD, A, ∆ = 0.1, P−
RD, B, ∆ = 0.1, P−
RD, tB, ∆ = 0.1, P−
FIG. 2. Rate of accuracy (a) and probability of cascading before N
(b) of the extended model with ∆ = 0.1 solved by the exact λj,A,
the blind λj,B and the twisted Bayesian λj,tB .
TABLE I. Possible action outcomes following different λjs. qext =
0.5, ∆ = 0.1, p = 0.7.
~s 1 -1 -1 -1
~a, λj,A 1 1 -1 -1
~a, λj,B 1 1 1 1
~a, λj,tB 1 1 1 1
it is more likely that sw = −1. Here we assume that the
second learner, upon calculating λ2 = 0.5, randomly chose
a2 = 1. This leads to a wrong cascades in the cases of
λj,B and λj,tB . However, when λj,A is used, there is a
chance that such a false cascade can be corrected depending
on whether the third learner chose a3 = 1 or a3 = −1 when
λ3,A
(
sw|
(
a1, a2
)
= (1, 1) , s3 = −1
)
− 12 < ∆.
B. Emergence of pseudo-cascade and number of possible
signals corresponding to a given action outcome
It has been conjectured that cascade happens when two con-
secutive learners take the same action while the number of
a = 1 and a = −1 are the same in actions of previous learn-
ers, aj−1 = aj while N j−2,a+ = N
j−2,a
− . We call this a
pseudo-cascade. This conjecture will be true if λj,B is an ex-
act solution since when two consecutive actions are the same,
the next learner’s private signal will not be able to change the
sign of ∆Na. We have proved earlier that a real cascade,
which is a trap state that no later learners can ever come out
of, should be defined a learner choosing the same action no
matter what the private signal a learner receives is. These
two definitions are potentially different. In this section, we
want to investigate the difference between the two. We will
record the number of pseudo-cascade emerging and count it
towards nsc (~a) if the action after that consecutive same ac-
tion sequence is different. We want to know on average how
often this happens,
Nsc =
∑
~a
nsc (~a)P
~a
sw
. (43)
If the conjecture about pseudo-cascade is right then Nsc = 0.
From Fig. 3, we find that when ∆ = 0, Nsc = 0 and
there is no difference between the three decision-making pro-
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FIG. 3. Average number of pseudo cascading happening before real
cascading. qext = 0.5.
cedures. This implies that in this case, all pseudo-cascades
are in fact real cascades. When ∆ = 0.1, Nsc > 0 appears
in action outcomes from all three solutions and the one corre-
sponding to λj,A has the largest value. This means that there
are more pseudo-cascades corrected by the λj,A than the other
two. This can be seen as the reason why the average payoff
from λj,A is higher than the other two.
C. On average, when cascades happen
In our simulation, we used a relatively small size of popu-
lation, N = 30. In this section, we want to present evidence
that there is no need to go much further beyond that. An-
other interesting question is when is a good time for learners
to take actions if they have certain degree of freedom in choos-
ing when to act. One might intuitively guess that generally it
is better to act later than earlier and even if there is a cost of
waiting one should look to determine the best timing to act by
comparing the cost and the gain [16]. Here we try to provide
another perspective. We define an average cascading length,
L =
∑
~a
l~aP
~a
sw=1, (44)
and a probability of cascading before the nth step,
P (±1,0),≤ncas =
an=±1,0∑
~a,l~a≤n
P~asw=1. (45)
Here l~a is defined in §III E and it denotes the position of the
first learner whose private signal does not make any differ-
ence in action. Eq. (45) is in fact a generalization of Eq.
(41), where n takes a specific value N . We plot L vs. p and
P+,≤ncas vs. p in Fig. 4. We see from Fig. 4(a) that for all
values of p, L is always much smaller than N , which means
that on average cascading happens far before the end of the
game. We also find from Fig. 4(b) that P+,≤2Lcas is very close
to P+,≤Ncas although P+,≤Lcas , the cascading probability before
the average length L is considerably smaller than the whole
cascading probability P+,≤Ncas . This means that choosing to
act near 2L is on average long enough that whatever cascad-
ing is going to happen it likely happened already. Notice that
2L is still much smaller than N . This defined average cas-
cading length is also meaningful in determining scales of ad-
vertising/manipulation. For example, in an experiment of two
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0, qext = 0.5.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
r
p
N = 5
N = 10
N = 15
N = 20
N = 25
N = 30
FIG. 5. Rate of accuracy found from the exact solution for various
values of N . ∆ = 0, qext = 0.5.
economists secretly buying one of their own books, determin-
ing the minimum but sufficient number of copies initially pur-
chased is an important task. We believe this L is a good index
for this purpose.
Note that L ≪ N and P+,≤2Lcas is already very close to
P+,≤Ncas . This implies that for our numerical study to obtain
an accurate overall picture of the game, ideally with infinite
N , it is in fact not necessary to have N be too much larger
than several times L, which for the maximum case is around
3. To test this further, we plot the rate of accuracy found from
the exact solution for various values of N in Fig. 5. This plot
shows that the difference between N = 25 and N = 30 is
very small. This confirms that it was reasonable to set N = 30
for all previous game results.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
An exact solution to the original social learning game is
proposed and logical gaps in the two approximate but com-
monly used solutions are discussed. In order to demonstrate
the three solutions are not only different in principle but also
lead to different outcomes in actions and payoffs, we modified
the game to incorporate a parameter ∆, which stands for level
of reservation for risk taking.
We have also confirmed via numerical results from simula-
tions that action outcomes and thus the received payoffs from
λj,A is different from the outcomes from λj,B or λj,tB .
Why the two approximate solutions work so well on the
original game? We have shown that λj,B is equivalent to as-
sume that the game enters into a cascade after two consecutive
learners take the same action and we have also discussed that
the difference between λj,A and λj,B is that there is a chance
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of getting out of wrong cascades when λj,A is used. This is in
fact why λj,A is potentially better than λj,B , where there is no
such a chance of correction. However, we have seen that there
is not a big chance of happening of such events of getting out
of cascading in real game playing when ∆ = 0. This is why
λj,B , while not exact, is not that bad at all. When it comes
to λj,tB , the assumption that sjeff = aj , while it is not exact
either, is not that far off. Upon observing aj = 1 it is a safe
guess to take sj = 1 too and this – regarding sj as aj – makes
λj,tB equivalently λj,B . That is why these inexact solutions
are more or less acceptable. However, we want to emphasize
again that in principle, there are logical gaps in both.
It is very costly, in the sense that large amount of tricky
mathematical calculation is required to adopt λj,A, for a
learner to really implement the exact solution. How close are
results from our human decision making processes to the ex-
act solution? This is another interesting question. A trivial
solution to this is that once learners understand that this more
involved formula is what is needed to play the social learning
game, they can always use computer to help them in decision
making. A highly non-trivial question will be, in game play-
ing processes in the real world, should we expect that action
outcomes to be close to those predicted by λj,A, or the other
two? This should be a question of further investigation.
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